Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups A Game Theoretic Approach,Nina Ismael
-About this book
This book seeks to understand the role of competition on the attack behavior of terror organizations by developing a game-theoretical model, which enables the study of strategic interaction among terrorist groups, competing for funding and followers.
The analysis will show that a contest between two organizations can be interpreted as a race for support, which, in turn, may explain, why dramatic attacks occur at all, though not as a result of outbidding but as a result of losing the race.
Nevertheless, it also reveals that groups vying for superiority among their followership have in incentive to participate in the race and to risk losing instead of choosing an attack pattern that provides them with a better outcome, when compared to the outcome of losing.
-Contents
1 Introduction
References
2 On Terrorism
2.1 In Search of a Definition
2.2 What Makes a Terrorist?
2.3 The Economic Impacts of Terrorism
2.3.1 Effects on Households
2.3.2 Effects on the Private Sector
2.3.3 Effects on Governments
References
3 Terrorism as a Mode of Warfare
3.1 Strategy or Tactics … or Whatever
3.2 Guerrilla Warfare and Terrorism
3.3 The “Strategies” of Terrorism
3.3.1 Attrition
3.3.2 Spoiling
3.3.3 Provocation
3.3.4 Intimidation
3.3.5 Advertising
3.3.6 Outbidding
3.4 Some Comments on the Choice of Target
References
4 The Economics of Terrorism
4.1 Terrorism and Rationality: A Contradiction?
4.2 Countermeasures
4.3 The Facets of Competition in the Context of Terrorism
4.3.1 Faction-Specific Competition
4.3.2 Cooperation and Alliances
4.3.3 Outbidding Continued and Differentiation
References
5 Competition Between Homogenous Terrorist Organizations: A General Model
5.1 Building The Model
5.1.1 Why Large-Scale Attacks Occur At All
5.1.2 A Not So Obvious Dominant Strategy
References
6 Al-Qaeda and Daesh: The Rise of the Islamic State
6.1 Origins and Raisons d’être
6.2 Case Study: Jabhat Fateh al-Sham Versus Daesh
6.3 Case Study: Towards a Model for al-Qaeda and Daesh
References
7 Conclusion
Reference
Appendix A
Appendix B
-caractéristiques
Date de parution :2020
N.des pages: 102 pages
ISBN-13 : 978-3030513061
Publisher : Springer
Language: English







Reviews
There are no reviews yet.